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The integration of developing countries in the world economy during the last three decades
has often coincided with increases in the skill premium. These trends are at odds the predictions
of the Heckscher-Ohlin trade model where trade opening in skill-scarce developing countries
leads to a reduction in the skill premium. Thus, the recent literature has proposed several
alternative channels through which trade liberalization can increase the relative demand for
skill in developing countries. In particular, the empirical ﬁnding that exporters are more skill-
intensive than non-exporters suggests that expanded export opportunities might induce ﬁrms
to upgrade skill. In this paper I present a model where trade liberalization induces the most
productive ﬁrms (exporters) to adopt skill-intensive production technologies. I test the model
in the context of a regional free trade agreement, MERCOSUR. I ﬁnd that the increase in
the relative demand of skilled labor does not come from labor reallocation across sectors or
ﬁrms but from skill upgrading within ﬁrms. In addition, ﬁrms that upgrade technology faster
also upgrade skill faster. Finally, I ﬁnd that the reduction in Brazil’s tariﬀs induces the most
productive Argentinean ﬁrms to upgrade skill, while the least productive ones downgrade, as
predicted by the model.
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The integration of developing countries in the world economy during the last three decades has
often coincided with increases in the skill premium [Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007)].1 These trends
are at odds with the predictions of the Heckscher-Ohlin trade model where trade opening in skill-
scarce developing countries leads to a reduction in the skill premium. Thus, the recent literature
has proposed several alternative mechanisms through which trade liberalization can increase the
relative demand for skill in developing countries.2 In particular, the empirical ﬁnding that exporters
are more skill-intensive than non-exporters suggests that trade liberalization might induce ﬁrms to
upgrade skill.3 In this paper I study a regional free trade agreement, and show that a reduction in
trading partner’s tariﬀs induces the most productive ﬁrms (exporters) to upgrade skill while the
least productive ﬁrms downgrade.
I analyze a panel of Argentinean manufacturing ﬁrms covering the regional trade liberalization
period. The main advantage of this data set is that it includes information on the educational
level of workers, while standard industry surveys only classify workers into production and non-
production occupational categories. In a preliminary analysis of the data, I ﬁnd that the relative
employment of skilled labor (deﬁned as college equivalents/high school and below)4 increased 16
percent in the period 1992-1996. Galiani and Sanguinetti (2003) report that during the same
period the college wage premium increased 7 percentage points per year in the industrial sector.
The simultaneous increase in relative prices and quantities of skilled labor indicates that the rise
in the equilibrium relative employment of skilled labor must come from a demand shift.
To shed light on the possible causes of the increase in the aggregate demand for skill, I start by
1See Gindling and Robbins (2001) and Pavcnik (2003) on Chile; Galiani and Sanguinetti (2003) on Argentina,
Attanasio Goldberg and Pavcnik (2004) on Colombia, Hanson and Harrison (1999) on Mexico, Topalova (2005) on
India, Hsieh and Woo (2005) on Hong Kong.
2Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007) note that the increase in the skill premium in Latin American countries can be
reconciled with the H-O framework if unskilled-labor-intensive industries were relatively more protected prior to
liberalization, or if the countries also open up to trade with more unskilled-labor-abundant countries like China.
Feenstra and Hanson (1996, 1997) develop a model that accounts for the simultaneous increase in the skill premium
in a developed and a developing country when they open up to trade, introducing capital movements and trade in
intermediate inputs, explaining the increase in the relative demand for skilled labor within sectors. Antras, Garicano
and Rossi- Hansberg (2006) present a model where globalization leads to the formation of hierarchical teams across
countries, leading to higher wage inequality in developing countries as higher ability workers form teams with managers
in developed countries. Bernard and Jensen (1997) note that exporters are more skill-intensive than non-exporters
in the U.S., thus a reallocation of market shares towards exporters can increase the demand for skill.
3See Bernard and Jensen (1997) for evidence on U.S. ﬁrms, Yeaple (2005) for a theoretical model and Verhoogen
(2008) for a theoretical model and evidence on Mexican ﬁrms.
4More precisely, the relative employment of skilled labor is deﬁned as the ratio of employment of skilled workers
and unskilled workers. Skilled workers are college graduates plus technical education graduates converted to college
equivalents using the 1992 college wage premium. Unskilled workers are high school graduates and below converted
to less than highschool equivalents using the 1992 high school wage premium. As in both years workers are weighted
by the 1992 wage premium, measured changes in the equilibrium relative demand of skilled labor only reﬂect changes
in quantities, and not in prices. I use the wage premia estimated by Galeani and Porto (2010) and Gasparini et al.
(2005) using Argentina’s household surveys.
1decomposing it in changes within and between industries.5 This is important, as the increase in the
relative demand for skill could result from reallocations of labor towards skill-intensive industries,
as predicted by the H-O model. However, I ﬁnd that the increase in the relative demand of
skilled labor does not come from labor reallocation across sectors, nor across ﬁrms, but from skill
upgrading within ﬁrms. A second alternative is that ﬁrms are outsourcing production activities to
less skill-abundant countries to focus on non-production activities. Nevertheless, I ﬁnd that most
of the increase in the relative employment of skilled labor is explained by skill upgrading within
production (P), non-production (NP) and R&D occupational categories, with reallocations of labor
from P towards NP and R&D playing a minor role.
The ﬁnding that ﬁrms upgrade skill in a context of increasing skill premium suggests that
ﬁrm-level skill demands are shifting out, that is, ﬁrms are changing the skill-intensity of their
production technology. To explore this issue further, I make use of an additional feature of this
data set, namely that it permits to build a comprehensive measure of spending in technology, as it
includes information on spending on computers and software; technology transfers and patents; and
equipment, materials and labor related to innovation activities performed within the ﬁrm.6 I ﬁnd
that ﬁrms that upgrade technology faster also upgrade skill faster. This evidence points towards
technology upgrading within sectors and ﬁrms as the main proximate cause of the increase in the
relative demand of skilled labor.7 Therefore, the remaining of the paper focuses on investigating
the eﬀects of trade liberalization on within-ﬁrm skill upgrading through the technology adoption
channel.
To guide empirical work, I present simple model that builds on work by Melitz (2003) and Yeaple
(2005).8 In the model, ﬁrms are heterogeneous in an underlying productivity parameter, and must
incur ﬁxed costs to enter the export market. In addition, ﬁrms can adopt a lower marginal cost
skill-intensive technology, after paying a ﬁxed cost. In equilibrium, ﬁrms sort into three groups:
the most productive ﬁrms adopt the new technology and export, the middle group exports but
remains using the old technology, and the least productive ﬁrms only serve the domestic market
using the old technology. A bilateral reduction in tariﬀs increases export revenues inducing ﬁrms
in the middle range of the productivity distribution to enter the export market and adopt the
new technology. Adoption of skill-intensive new technologies and the trade-induced reallocations
5This paralells the analysis in Berman, Bound and Griliches (1994) for the U.S.
6Such as R&D, adaptation of new products or production processes, technical assistance for innovations in pro-
duction, organization, commercialization, engineering and industrial design.
7This evidence is consistent with the ﬁndings in Autor, Katz and Krueger (1998) and Machin and Van Reenen
(1998) for the U.S. and seven OECD countries, respectively.
8The theoretical framework also builds on work by Acemoglu (1998, 2003), Thoening and Verdier (2003), Neary
(2003), Ekholm and Midelfart (2005), and Gancia and Epifani (2006) who present models where trade induces ﬁrms
to develop or adopt skill-biased technologies.
2of market shares towards the most productive (high technology) ﬁrms increase the relative demand
for skilled labor and the skill premium.
In the model, initial heterogeneity determines diﬀerential ﬁrm-level responses to trade liberal-
ization. As export revenues increase, ﬁrms in the middle range of the productivity distribution
enter the export market. In addition, some ﬁrms in the upper-middle range cross a size thresh-
old above which technology adoption is proﬁtable. Note that the increase in the equilibrium skill
premium implies that ﬁrms who do not change technology must reduce their relative employment
of skilled labor. Thus, the model predicts heterogeneous eﬀects of trade liberalization on ﬁrm’s
skill intensity: while the least productive ﬁrms downgrade skill, ﬁrms in the upper-middle range
upgrade.
I test the model’s predictions in the context of the implementation of a regional free trade
agreement, MERCOSUR. During this period (1992-1996) Argentina’s exports to Brazil increased
fourfold while exports to the rest of the world increased only 60 percent. A ﬁr s tl o o ka tt h eﬁrm-
level data suggests that there is a strong association between export market participation and skill
upgrading: before liberalization exporters were more skill intensive than non-exporters; moreover,
both continuing and new exporters upgrade skill faster during the liberalization period. These
patterns could be a response to the regional free trade agreement or the result of other reforms
implemented during the same period. For example, capital account liberalization could have made
credit available allowing ﬁrms to invest in skill-biased new technologies and enter the export market.
Thus, to isolate the eﬀects of the expansion in export opportunities, I directly estimate the eﬀect
of reductions in Brazil’s tariﬀs on the skilled labor share of Argentinean ﬁrms.
Ie x p l o i tt h ed i ﬀerential reductions in Brazil’s tariﬀs across industries to identify the causal
eﬀects of a reduction in trading partner’s tariﬀs on the demand for skill. Brazil’s tariﬀ changes
provide for a good source of arguably exogenous variation for the following reasons. Brazil’s tariﬀs
fall from an average of 29 percentage points in 1991 to zero in 1995. Thus, tariﬀ changes are
predetermined by their initial level, which varies extensively across industries. Note that as these
are Brazilian most favored nation tariﬀs in 1991, their level is unlikely to be driven by Argentina’s
industry characteristics (Argentina’s share of Brazil’s trade was only 7.7 percent). In addition,
Brazil’s tariﬀ structure in 1991 reﬂected a transition between the import substitution regime, which
tended to protect unskilled-labor-intensive industries, and a new trade policy protecting some skill-
intensive industries. As a result, the correlation between the initial level of Brazil’s tariﬀsa n da n
exogenous measure of skill intensity is very low (-0.002).
I ﬁnd that the reduction in Brazil’s tariﬀs induces Argentinean ﬁrms below median size to
downgrade skill, while ﬁrms above median size upgrade, with ﬁner partitions producing similar
3results.910 Still, the eﬀect of tariﬀ reductions on the aggregate employment share of skilled labor
is positive, because ﬁrms above the median have a larger weight on labor demand. The estimates
imply that the average reduction in Brazil’s tariﬀs during the period 1992-1996 (23 percentage
points) explains one third of the increase in the aggregate employment share of skilled labor.11
Next, I investigate whether the reduction in Brazil’s tariﬀs induced skill upgrading through
the mechanism stressed by the model: adoption of new production technologies. In the model
ﬁrm’s export status, technology choice and skill intensity are a function of variable trade costs
and the ﬁrm’s underlying productivity. Thus, a straightforward way to test whether skill intensity
increases as the result of technology upgrading is to check whether the reduction in tariﬀs induced
technology and skill upgrading in the same region of the ﬁrm size distribution. In previous work
[Bustos (2011)] I found that the reduction in Brazil’s tariﬀs induced ﬁrms in the third quartile of
the ﬁrm size distribution to upgrade technology, which is consistent with the idea that these ﬁrms
crossed a size threshold above which technology adoption is proﬁtable. Instead, here I ﬁnd that
all ﬁrms above median size upgrade skill in response to tariﬀ cuts. As ﬁrms in the fourth quartile
were not induced to increase spending in technology by tariﬀ cuts, these ﬁndings suggest that there
might be additional mechanisms at work.
To investigate the mechanisms leading to skill upgrading further, I separate the skilled labor
share in its production and non-production components. I ﬁnd that the eﬀect of tariﬀso nt h e
skilled production labor share is strongest in the third quartile of the ﬁrm size distribution. As
the reduction in Brazil’s tariﬀs also induces technology upgrading mostly on the third quartile,
this ﬁnding suggests that tariﬀ reductions induce skill upgrading of production labor because they
induce ﬁrms to adopt new production technologies. Interestingly, the eﬀects of trade on non-
production labor follow a diﬀerent pattern. Tariﬀ reductions only aﬀect the skilled non-production
labor share for ﬁrms in the fourth quartile. As mentioned above, these ﬁrms are not induced to
9Im e a s u r eﬁrm size as employment in eﬃciency units relative to the mean in the corresponding 4-digit-industry.
Workers of diﬀerent educational atainment are weighted using the industrial sector skill-premia estimated by Galeani
and Porto (2010) and Gasparini et al (2005), as there is no information on wages in the survey. Very similar results
are obtained when ﬁrm sales are used as a measure of ﬁrm size. I prefer the employment measure as it reﬂects value
added better than sales.
10Note that to test the model´s predictions I interact tariﬀ changes with initial ﬁrm-size dummies instead of export
status dummies. This is because in previous work I found that Mercosur tariﬀ reductions had a strong impact on entry
in the export market [Bustos (2011)]. Thus, export status after liberalization is not only endogenously determined
with skill intensity in the model, but also positively correlated with the main source of exogenus variation: the
change in Brazil´s tariﬀs, in the data. As a result, I treat changes and levels in export status as an outcome (i.e.
a L.H.S. variable in regressions), like technology and skill intensity and the explanatory (i.e. R.H.S. variables) are
changes in tariﬀs and initial ﬁrm heterogeneity measured as relative ﬁrm size. Still, interactions of export status after
liberalization and tariﬀ changes produce the expected results: the reduction in Brazil´s tariﬀs induces non exporters
to downgrade skill while exporters upgrade. These tables are not reported in the paper because they do not provide
correct tests of the model for the endogeneity problems discussed above but are available upon request.
11To be more precise, it explains 38% of the within ﬁrm component of the increase in the aggregate employment
share of skilled labor.
4increase spending in technology by tariﬀ cuts. Thus, it is likely that there are other mechanisms
at work. In particular, these ﬁndings are consistent with the idea that foreign market access costs
have higher skilled labor requirements, as suggested by Hsieh and Woo (2005) and Matsuyama
(2007).12
The work I present in this paper builds on my previous work. In Bustos (2011) I present
and test a model where trade liberalization induces ﬁrms in the middle-range of the productivity
distribution to enter the export market and adopt new technologies. Here I study the eﬀects of
trade liberalization on the demand for skill. The data analysis reported above shows that the
increase in the aggregate relative demand for skill is explained mostly by within-ﬁrm increases
in skill intensity. In addition, ﬁrms upgrading technology faster also upgrade skill faster. These
ﬁndings point towards the adoption of skill-biased technologies as the main proximate cause of the
increase in the aggregate demand for skill in the manufacturing sector. Thus, I focus the subsequent
analysis on establishing the causal eﬀect of trade liberalization on skill upgrading through the
technology adoption channel. To guide empirical work, I extend the model in Bustos (2011) to an
economy with two types of labor (skilled and unskilled) where new technologies are skill-intensive.
As a result, new testable predictions emerge: trade liberalization induces ﬁrms in the middle
range of the productivity distribution to upgrade skill, but as the skill premium increases the least
and most productive ﬁrms downgrade skill. The empirical work I present here focuses on testing
these new predictions regarding skill intensity. To my knowledge, this is the ﬁrst paper showing
that a reduction in trading partner’s tariﬀs induces ﬁrms above median size to upgrade skill. In
addition, the ﬁnding that ﬁrms below median size downgrade skill is also new and highlights how
the expansion of exporters can impact non-exporters through general equilibrium eﬀects. These
new model’s predictions can be used to shed some light on the mechanism through which trading
partner’s tariﬀ reductions induce ﬁrms to upgrade skill. The analysis highlights that, although
ﬁrms in the upper-middle range of the productivity distribution respond to tariﬀ cuts by upgrading
technology and skill, as predicted by the model, the most productive ﬁrms do not follow the model’s
predictions. These ﬁrms do not upgrade technology but upgrade skill in response to tariﬀ cuts. This
ﬁnding suggests that other mechanisms related to skill upgrading within non-production activities
are also at work for the most productive ﬁrms. Establishing whether and how trade induces ﬁrms
to increase skill demand is relevant to determine the distribution of welfare gains from trade.
The work presented in this paper is related to the literature studying of the eﬀects of trade lib-
eralization on wage inequality. Recent theoretical papers study how trade liberalization can aﬀect
12Matsuyama (2007) presents a model where international tra d ei sm o r es k i l li n t e n s i v et h a nd o m e s t i ct r a d eb e c a u s e
it requires expertise in international business and language skills. Hsieh and Woo (2005) provide evuidence that
international trade-related activities are more skill-intensive than manufacturing in Hong-Kong.
5wages in the context of labor market frictions [Davis and Harrigan (2007), Egger and Kreickemeier
(2009), Amiti and Davis (forthcoming), Helpman, Itskhoki and Redding (2010)]. The model pre-
sented in this paper instead focuses on how trade aﬀects the returns to observable skills, namely
education, in a neoclassical labor market. Other recent papers like Ohnsorge and Treﬂer (2007)
and Costinot and Vogel (2009) study the eﬀects of trade on wage inequality in competitive assign-
ment models. Burstein and Vogel (2009) develop a model in which both comparative advantage
and skill-biased technology shape the relationship between trade and wage inequality. The main
diﬀerential feature of the model presented here is that ﬁrms can choose to adopt a skill-intensive
technology; thus trade liberalization generates an upwards shift in ﬁrm-level skill demands. This
generates an increase in the skill intensity of production within ﬁrms that upgrade technology,
despite the increase in the skill premium.
An important precedent of this paper is Verhoogen (2008) who shows that a devaluation in
Mexico induced the most productive ﬁrms to raise the export share of sales and wages relative to
less productive plants. In further work, Frias, Kaplan and Verhoogen (2009) show that the increase
in wages induced by the Mexican devaluation reﬂects changes in wage premia and not changes in
the skill composition of the labor force. Instead, I ﬁnd that a reduction in Brazil’s tariﬀs induces
the most productive ﬁrms to upgrade skill. I see these results as complementary, rather than
contradictory: the diﬀerence in results might be due to the diﬀerent nature of the shocks to the
proﬁtability of exports analyzed. It is possible that a devaluation is perceived as more temporary
than a regional trade liberalization and is thus less likely to aﬀect investment decisions.13
Finally, my work builds on the empirical literature studying the eﬀects of trade liberalization
on wages through changes in tariﬀs [Attanasio, Goldberg and Pavcnik (2004), Topalova (2005),
Amiti and Davis (forthcoming), Menezes-Filho and Muendler (2007), Galeani and Porto (forth-
coming)]. I see this paper as complementary to these studies as most of them focus on the eﬀects
of unilateral trade liberalizations, while the analysis of bilateral liberalizations are rare. One of the
few studies of the eﬀects of trading partner’s tariﬀ reductions on ﬁr m si sT r e ﬂer’s (2004) analysis
of the Canada U.S. Free Trade Agreement. Treﬂer ﬁnds evidence that U.S. tariﬀ concessions in-
duced labor reallocation towards non-production-labor intensive plants, but no evidence that they
induced within-plant skill upgrading in Canada.14 Instead, I ﬁnd that the main eﬀect of tariﬀs
13This might also explain the diﬀerence in the ﬁndings presented here and in Brambilla, Lederman and Porto (2010)
who study the eﬀect of the 1999 devaluation in Brazil (a negative export shock) on wages of Argentinean exporters.
14Treﬂer (2004) ﬁnds that U.S. tariﬀ concessions generated an increase in the ratio of NP to P workers in Canada
at the industry-level but not at the plant-level, concluding that market shares might have shifted in favor of non-
production-worker intensive plants. The only evidence pointing towards within-ﬁrm skill upgrading is a small increase
in wages but it mostly driven by reductions in Canadian tariﬀs, not U.S. tariﬀ concessions. Treﬂer investigates whether
this increase in wages reﬂects skill upgrading or increases in wage premia and ﬁnds that Canadian tariﬀ reductions
are positively correlated with years of education, but only if the clothing industry is included in the sample. In sum,
6is within-ﬁrm skill upgrading in Argentina. This diﬀerence in results can be rationalized by the
model, as it predicts that tariﬀ reductions have an eﬀect on technology and skill upgrading only if
the fraction of high technology ﬁrms is lower than the fraction of exporters, which is more likely to
be the case in developing countries with high costs of technology adoption.
The next section describes the trade liberalization in Argentina and the data set. Section 2
provides preliminary empirical evidence on the increase in the relative demand for skill and describes
broad patterns in the data that motivate the assumptions in the model. Section 3 develops the
theoretical model and derives the empirical predictions on the eﬀects of trade liberalization the
demand for skill. Section 4 presents the empirical strategy and tests the predictions of the model.
Section 5 concludes.
1C o n t e x t a n d D a t a
1.1 Trade Liberalization
At the beginning of the 1990’s, Argentina undertook a broad reform program that included trade
and capital account liberalization. Trade liberalization was implemented ﬁrst through unilateral
policies, and was later complemented by regional trade liberalization through the MERCOSUR
treaty, and the multilateral negotiations of the General Agreement on Tariﬀs and Trade (GATT).
Trade liberalization started as a unilateral policy in 1988, as the result of negotiations started
in the context of structural reforms supported by the World Bank. In March 1991 MERCOSUR, a
regional free trade agreement, was signed between Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay. The
agreement established generalized, linear and automatic reductions in tariﬀs, and the adoption of
a common external tariﬀ with third countries. Tariﬀ reductions were to be gradually implemented
according to a timetable starting in December 1991 with the objective to achieve free trade within
the region by the end of 1994. Finally, the Customs Union was established in 1995 with the adoption
of a Common External Tariﬀ (CET) [For a more detailed discussion of the regional and unilateral
trade liberalization policies see Bustos (2011)].
During the period of implementation of MERCOSUR (1992-1996) Argentinean exports to Brazil
quadrupled, while exports to the rest of the world only increased 60%. This might be related to
deep reduction in Brazil’s tariﬀs during this period. The average reduction in Brazil’s tariﬀsi nt h e
period 1992-1996 is 24 p.p. These tariﬀ reductions varied extensibly across industries, as initial
m.f.n tariﬀs were between 1 and 63 percentage points (Table A1 in the Appendix reports summary
statistics for m.f.n tariﬀs at the 4-digit-ISIC industry level of aggregation in the period under study).
the paper does not report evidence that a reduction in trading partner’s tariﬀs induces ﬁrms to upgrade skill.
7As Argentina’s unilateral trade liberalization occurred before the period under study, between
1992 and 1996 Argentina’s average import tariﬀs with respect to the rest of the world increased
slightly (1 p.p.). Still, there were changes in tariﬀs in both directions, from -10 p.p. to 14 p.p.
across 4-digit-ISIC industries, which were partly related to the convergence to the CET. Argentina’s
imports from Brazil grew at the same pace as imports from the rest of the world in the period under
study (60%). This might be due to the fact that Argentina’s unilateral liberalization preceded
MERCOSUR. Thus, the baseline for the reduction in Argentina’s tariﬀsf o ri m p o r t sf r o mB r a z i l
was only 13 percentage points on average. Still, there was signiﬁc a n tv a r i a t i o ni nt a r i ﬀsa c r o s s
4-digit-ISIC industries, from 0 to 22 p.p (See Appendix Table A1).15
Brazil’s Trade Policy
The source of identiﬁcation of the eﬀect of tariﬀ reductions on ﬁrm-level employment of skilled
labor are diﬀerences across industries in the level of m.f.n. tariﬀs in Brazil in 1992. Thus, it is
important to asses whether Brazil’s trade policy is exogenous w.r.t. the outcome analyzed, skill
intensity in Argentina.
Brazil implemented a program of unilateral trade liberalization between 1988 and 1994. Thus,
Brazil’s m.f.n. tariﬀ rates in 1992 reﬂect a transition between import substitution policy and a
new tariﬀ structure protecting some skill-intensive industries. Possibly as a result, the correlation
between Brazil’s tariﬀs in 1992 and an exogenous measure of skill intensity of the industry is very
low (-0.002). Still, the omission of industry characteristics that are correlated with Brazil’s trade
policy might induce biases in the estimation of the impact of the reduction in Brazil’s tariﬀso n
skill intensity. Thus, I perform robustness checks by including controls for 2-digit-ISIC-industry
dummies that absorb part of the correlation between changes in tariﬀs and industry characteristics.
In addition, I control for measures of capital, skill intensity and the elasticity of demand.
1.2 Data
1.2.1 Firm-Level Data
The data I analyze comes from the Encuesta Nacional de Innovación y Conducta Tecnológica
de las Empresas Argentinas (ENIT) [National Survey on Innovation and Technological Behavior
of Industrial Argentinean Firms] conducted by the Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos
(INDEC), the Argentinean government statistical agency. The survey covers the period 1992-1996
15In addition, Table A1 reports average m.f.n. input tariﬀs for Argentina as these are used for robustness checks
in the empirical analysis. The input tariﬀ for each industry is computed as a weighted average of the tariﬀso fa l l
inputs used, where the weights are based on the cost share of each input obtained from the input-output matrix of
Argentina, as described in Bustos (2010). The baseline m.f.n rates for Argentina’s input tariﬀ reductions w.r.t Brazil
were on average 11 p.p. in 1992.
8and was conducted in 1997 over a sample of 1,639 industrial ﬁr m s . T h es a m p l ei sr e p r e s e n t a t i v e
of ﬁrms owning establishments with more than 10 employees, and is based on 1993 census data.16
As the survey was conducted in 1997, it does not contain information on ﬁrms that were active in
1992 and exited afterwards.
The survey contains information on sales, exports, imports, employment by education and
investment for the years 1992 and 1996 while information on spending in technology is available
for all the years in the period 1992-1996. I focus my analysis on a balanced panel of 1,359 ﬁrms
present both in 1992 and 1996 for which there is information on sales, employment and belong to
4-digit-ISIC industries with information on Brazil’s tariﬀs.17
As noted above, the initial year in the data is 1992 while the major trade liberalization measures
were taken at the end of 1991. Still, the data for 1992 can be a good indication of the situation
before liberalization started to have a considerable impact on exports and skill upgrading. This
is because the instability of the previous period brought a high degree of uncertainty on whether
the reforms taken at the end of 1991 would be permanent. For instance, industrial exports to
Brazil only started growing in 1993. Similarly, many investment decisions are likely to have been
delayed until the reform was perceived as permanent. Thus, when analyzing the data, I use 1992
as an indicator for the situation before liberalization had a signiﬁcant impact, and 1993-1996 as
the period after liberalization.
Education Level of Workers An important advantage of this survey over standard industrial
surveys is that it contains direct information on the educational level of workers. Table 1.1 reports
the change in employment by educational categories between 1992 and 1996. This change is ordered
by skill, with employment of engineers growing 13.5% while employment of high school and primary
school graduates fell 8.4%.
I aggregated workers into two skill categories to obtain a measure of the equilibrium relative
demand for skill (S/U). Skilled workers (S) are college graduates plus technical education graduates
converted to college equivalents.18 Unskilled workers (U) are high school graduates and below
converted to less than high school equivalents.19 This aggregation scheme would provide for a
16According to the census 15% of establishments had more than 10 employees, they represented 90,7% of the value
of output, 90,9% of industrial value added, 87,9% of employment and 94,1% of the wage bill.
17I also trim the sample by excluding ﬁrms with changes in skilled labor ratios on the top and bottom percentiles,
following a suggestion by Angrist and Krueger (1999).
18College graduates completed 5 to 6 years of education after high school, while technicians usually completed 2 to
3 years of education after high school.
19The survey classiﬁes workers according to education but although it distinguishes between engineers, other college
and technicians it does not distinguish within the categories of high school graduates and primary school graduates.
These last two categories are pooled together for non-production and R&D workers and are divided into “skilled
and specialized” and “unskilled” for production workers. As all the analysis in this paper is performed pooling high
school and primary school workers into the unskilled labor category this does not present inconveniences, except that it
9correct measure of the equilibrium relative demand for skill if workers within skill categories were
perfect substitutes, and is a good approximation when the elasticity of substitution is higher within
than across categories.20 This seems to be a reasonable assumption, as the employment of college
graduates and technicians increased by a similar amount (6,6%) while the employment of high
school graduates and below fell (8.4%). The conversion of workers to college and less than high
school equivalents was done using the 1992 educational wage premia.21 Then, reported changes in
the relative employment of skilled labor reﬂect changes in employment and not in wages. Overall,
between 1992 and 1996, the relative employment of skilled labor increased by 16.1% in the balanced
panel of 1359 ﬁrms (Table 1.2).
An alternative measure of the equilibrium relative demand for skill is the employment of share







where t = 1992 , 1996 and 1992 is the skill premium in 1992. Note that as skilled labor is weighted
by the skill premium in 1992, changes in relative employment of skilled workers reﬂect changes
in quantities of skilled and unskilled labor, and not changes in the skill premium. Overall, the
employment share of skilled labor increased by 12.4% in the balanced panel of 1359 ﬁrms (Table
1.3).
In what follows, I use the employment of share of skilled labor in eﬃciency units as a measure
of skill intensity because this permits to perform the ﬁrm-level analysis on the full sample of ﬁrms.
Instead, the relative employment of skilled workers (and its log) is not deﬁned for some ﬁrms that
have zero skilled or unskilled workers. Still, all the results in the paper are robust to using either
measure of skill intensity.
The survey also classiﬁes workers according to production (P), non-production (NP) and R&D
occupational categories, which permits to investigate whether the increase in the relative demand
of skilled labor came primarily from reallocations from production to non-production and R&D
activities. Table 2 reports the skill intensity of each of these activities: non-production is around
2.3 times more skill-intensive than production, and R&D around 4.7 times more skill-intensive
aﬀects the weighting of these types of workers to convert them in primary school equivalents. For this purpose workers
have been assigned into one of these categories by assuming that the overall share of high school and primary school
workers is the same as the one reported in the next wave of this survey (1998-2001) that does diﬀerentiate between
these educational categories. Then, workers reported as high school or primary school workers in non-production
and R&D are assigned in a fraction 0.46 to high school graduates. For production workers, “skilled and specialized”
workers are also assigned in a fraction 0.46 to high school graduates while “unskilled” workers are assigned to primary
school graduates. Alternative assignments or measures of the relative employment of skilled workers unweighted by
skill premiums give similar results to the ones reported.
20For a thorough discussion about aggregation of labor categories see Katz and Author (1999).
21Estimated by mincerian regressions from Household Survey data in Sebastian Galiani and Guido Porto (forth-
coming) and Leonardo Gasparini, Mariana Marchionni and Walter Sosa Escudero (2005).
10than production. This pattern is consistent with the ﬁndings in Berman, Bound and Griliches
(1994) for the U.S. regarding the higher educational level of non-production relative to production
workers. Most empirical studies using industry or ﬁrm-level data use production workers as a
proxy for unskilled labor, and non-production workers as a proxy for skilled labor, given that the
P/NP classiﬁcation is the only one available in standard industry surveys and censuses. These
studies capture primarily the reallocations from production to non-production labor, but miss skill
upgrading within occupational categories, as I show in the next section.
Spending on Technology Firms can change their production technology in diﬀerent ways:
they can engage in internal R&D or adopt technologies developed elsewhere through the purchase
of technology transfers and capital goods that embody new technologies. The survey contains
information on several dimensions of spending on technology which permits to construct a compre-
hensive measure of spending on technology (ST) including: spending on computers and software;
payments for technology transfers and patents; and spending on equipment, materials and labor
related to innovation activities performed within the ﬁrm. In the survey innovation activities are
deﬁned as having the purpose of changing production processes, products, organizational forms or
commercialization.
The survey contains information on ST for all years in the period 1992-1996, while information
on all the rest of the variables (sales, exports, imports, employment by education, investment) is
only available for the years 1992 and 1996. Thus, to obtain a measure of changes in technology
in the period 1992-1996 I collapse the data in two sub-periods, one before (1992) and one after
liberalization (1993-1996) and take ﬁrst diﬀerences, as suggested by Marianne Bertrand, Esther
Duﬂo, and Sendhil Mullainathan (2004).22 Then, I deﬁne the change in ST in the liberalization







The survey also contains a list of 9 yes/ no questions asking whether the ﬁrm performed a certain
category of innovation or improvement in products or production process during the period 1992-
1996. As an example, one of these categories is: “product diﬀerentiation” and another “machinery
and equipment associated to new production process”. I use this information to construct an
innovation index equal to the fraction of categories for which the ﬁrm gave positive answers. A
detailed description of the questions is contained in Bustos (2011).
22An alternative would be to only use the information in 1992 and 1996. I chose the ﬁrst option to exploit all the
available information, and also to minimize the number of observations with zero ST. The ﬁrst alternative gives very
similar results, although the standard errors are slightly bigger.
11Table A.2 in the Appendix contains summary statistics by export status for the main variables
of interest for the initial year in the data, 1992.
1.2.2 Industry-Level Data
In the empirical section I use controls for 4-digit-ISIC industry characteristics that might be cor-
related with changes in tariﬀs. First, average capital and skill intensity in the industry in the
U.S. in the 1980’s obtained from the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) productivity
database.23 I also use the elasticity of substitution in the industry as estimated by Broda and
Weinstein (2006).
2 Preliminary Evidence
2.1 The Relative Demand for Skill
The coincidence of rising skill premia and increasing relative employment of skilled workers in the
period 1992-1996 indicates that there must have been an outwards shift in the relative demand of
skilled labor after trade liberalization.
Gasparini et al. (2002) report wage premia estimates from mincerian regressions using House-
hold Survey data. They ﬁnd that the college wage premium (the wage of college graduates relative
to the wage of primary school graduates) rose 19.4% between 1992 and 1998, after falling 3.7%
between 1986 and 1992. The high school wage premium rose much less (4.8%), and had been
constant during the previous period. Estimates for the industrial sector in Galeani and Sanguinetti
(2003) indicate that the college wage premium increased 7 percentage points per year during the
1990’s, after being stable in the 1980’s. They do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant trend for the high school
wage premium.
In the remaining of this section I analyze the changes in the relative employment of skilled and
unskilled workers in the industrial sector.
Decompositions of the Change in the Employment Share of Skilled Labor
The increase in the aggregate relative demand for skilled labor could be mainly driven by factor
reallocations towards skill-intensive sectors or ﬁrms, holding skill intensity within ﬁrms constant;
or by increases in skill intensity within ﬁrms, holding the share of each ﬁrm in total factor demand
constant. Assessing the relative importance of these two channels is a necessary step in the investi-
gation of the causes of the increase in the aggregate demand for skill. This is because reallocations
23Capital intensity is computed as CAP /EMP. CAP is the real capital stock in millions of 1987 dollars and EMP is
the number of employees. Skill Intensity is computed as (EMP-PRODE)/ EMP. PRODE is the number of production
workers in 1,000s. These variables are described in more detail in Bartelsman and Gray (1996).
12of factors across sectors or ﬁrms can be driven directly by trade liberalization, holding ﬁrm technol-
ogy constant. Instead, within ﬁrm increases in skill intensity point towards changes in production
technology. This is because ﬁrms who keep using the same (homotetic) production technology
should decrease skill intensity in response to the increase in the skill premium documented above.
Thus, the ﬁnding that within ﬁrm increases in skill intensity are important suggests that trade
liberalization aﬀects skill intensity through changes in production technology.
I perform three diﬀerent decompositions of the increase in the aggregate employment of skilled
labor: ﬁrst between and within occupational categories (P, NP and R&D); second within and
between sectors; third within and between ﬁrms.
To assess the importance of skill upgrading within occupational categories relative to realloca-
tions from production to non-production and R&D, I perform the following decomposition of the
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intensity in category i; a bar over a term denotes a mean over time (1992 and 1996) and a ∆ before
a term denotes a change over time (from 1992 to 1996). The ﬁrst term on the right reports the
change in aggregate skill intensity attributable to shifts in employment shares between occupational
categories holding skill intensity within categories constant. The second term reports the change in
aggregate skill intensity attributable to changes in skill intensity within each occupational category.
Table 3 reports the between and within decompositions of the aggregate increase in skill intensity
in the period 1992-1996. Of the 12.3 percent increase, only 2 points are explained by reallocations
from production to non-production and R&D occupational categories, and 10.2 points correspond
to skill upgrading within categories, of which 6.5 points correspond to production and 3.5 points
to non-production. That most skill upgrading occurs within occupational categories suggests that
studies using variation between these categories as proxies for skill upgrading might be missing
an important part of it. In addition, it points towards changes in the production function within
occupational categories, favoring the technological change over other explanations for skill upgrad-
ing that rely on reallocations of demand towards skill-intensive non-production activities due to
outsourcing of production activities or the increasing importance of services over goods.
The relative importance of technological change versus market share or production factor real-
locations can also be assessed by decomposing the aggregate increase in skill intensity in changes
within and across industries. In this case the decomposition can also be described by equation
13(1) with  denoting industry at 4-digit-ISIC classiﬁcation. Table 4 reports the between and within
industry decompositions of the aggregate increase in skill intensity in the period 1992-1996. Most
of the 12.4 percent increase is explained by within-industry skill upgrading (11 points), the between
component being small (1.5 points). Moreover, most of it is explained by skill upgrading within
ﬁrms (10.6 points). There is one important caveat to take into account for interpretation of this
evidence: the sample I analyze does not contain entry and exit, thus the reallocations across sectors
and ﬁrms that occur through entry and exit are missed in these calculations.
That most skill upgrading occurred within 4-digit-ISIC industries is consistent with the ﬁndings
for the U.S. [Berman, Bound and Griliches (1994)] and several Latin American countries [Goldberg
and Pavcnik (2007)]. In addition, the ﬁnding that most of the increase in the relative demand for
skill is explained by skill upgrading within ﬁrms points towards changes in production technology as
the main cause of the increase in the relative demand of skilled labor. Thus, the next sections focus
on investigating the eﬀects of trade on skill upgrading through the technology adoption channel.
2.2 Technology and Skill Upgrading
In this subsection I investigate the relationship between technology and skill upgrading. I relate
the change in the share of skilled labor between 1992 and 1996 to diﬀerent measures of technology







=  + ∆log +  (2)
where i indexes ﬁrms and ∆ denotes a change over time. This regression can only be run in the
sub-sample of ﬁrms that have positive spending on technology in both sub-periods (880 out of 1359
ﬁrms), which is not representative as these ﬁrms tend to be bigger.24 Thus, as a robustness check,
I also estimate equation (2) using the product and process innovation indexes as these are available
for a larger sub-sample of ﬁrms (1280 ﬁrms) that is representative in terms of size.
Estimation results are presented in Table 5. Column 1 shows that ﬁrms that increase spending in
technology faster also upgrade skill faster. The estimated coeﬃcient (0.544, t=3.32) implies that a
one standard deviation increase in spending in technology is associated with a 0.62 percentage points
increase in skill intensity, which represents 29% of the average increase for this sample. Column 2
shows that the estimated coeﬃcient () is robust to the inclusion of 2-digit-ISIC industry dummies
in the regression, which attempt to control for unobserved time-varying industry characteristics, like
24Only 14% of ﬁrms reporting a positive spending in technology belong to the ﬁrst size quartile and 24% belong
to the second. Thus, results might not be representative for ﬁrms below the median size.
14the speed of technological change. The product and process innovation indexes are also positively
correlated with skill upgrading, as shown in columns 3 to 8.
The positive correlation between technology and skill upgrading reported in Table 5, suggests
that new technologies are more skill-intensive.
2.3 Export Status and Skill Upgrading
In this section, I document systematic diﬀerences in skill intensity of both production and non-
production labor between exporters and non exporters.
Table 6 reports the diﬀerences between ﬁrms that exported both in 1992 and 1996 (continuing
exporters), ﬁrms that exported in 1996 but not in 1992 (new exporters), and ﬁrms that only
serve the domestic market (non exporters). The continuing exporter and new exporter premia are
estimated from a regression of the form
ln =  +  +  +  +  + 
where  indexes ﬁrms,  indexes industries (4-digit-SIC classiﬁcation);  are new exporters, 
are continuing exporters,  are ﬁrms that exported in 1992 but didn’t in 1996,25 and the reference
category relative to which diﬀerences are estimated is non-exporters;  are industry dummies,
and Y is the ﬁrm characteristic for which the premia are estimated. Firm characteristics include
the employment share of skilled labor and its disaggregation in production and non-production
activities. In addition, the table reports diﬀerences in size and spending on technology per worker
that reproduce the ﬁndings in Bustos (2011).
In 1992, exporters are 1.7 log points bigger than never exporters. More importantly, they have
a 5.1 percentage points higher share of skilled labor, which reﬂects both higher skill intensity of
production labor (1.84 p.p.) and non production labor (2.38 p.p.). In addition, they have a 0.34
log points higher level of spending in technology per worker. In contrast, ﬁrms that would enter
the export market after trade liberalization, but still do not export in 1992, are only 1.08 log points
bigger than never exporters and do not have a signiﬁcantly higher share of skilled labor or spending
in technology. Still, these ﬁrms upgrade technology and skill faster than never exporters as they
enter the export market during the trade liberalization period, becoming thus more technology and
skill intensive.
The patterns in the data reported in Table 6 suggest that exporting is associated with the use
25Only 28 out of 1516 ﬁrms are in this category, thus it is hard to interpret the coeﬃcients on this group, specially
because some of the zeros for 1996 could be imputed. I only include them as a control group.
15of a production function that is both more technology and skill intensive. In the following section I
present a model that is consistent with these empirical patterns and generates some new predictions
regarding the impact of trade liberalization on ﬁrm-level skill demands.
3T h e o r y
In this section I present a simple model of trade with heterogeneous ﬁrms who decide whether to
enter the export market and adopt skill-biased new technologies. I consider two symmetric coun-
tries engaging in bilateral trade liberalization. Each economy consists of a single monopolistically
competitive industry where ﬁrms produce diﬀerentiated products under increasing returns to scale,
as in Krugman (1979). Firms are heterogeneous in productivity and face ﬁxed exporting costs as in
Melitz (2003). In addition, ﬁrms can choose to increase their productivity by adopting a skill-biased
new technology.
3.1 Setup of the Model
There are two identical countries. Each country is endowed with  units of skilled labor and 
units of unskilled labor used to produce diﬀerentiated products in a single industry. I present the
discussion from the point of view of the home country.
Preferences
Consumer preferences are deﬁned over a continuum of horizontally-diﬀerentiated varieties within the











an elasticity of substitution  =1 1−1These preferences generate a demand function ()=










is the price of the aggregate consumption good deﬁned as  ≡ ,  is the number (measure) of
existing varieties, and  is the aggregate level of spending in the country.
Entry
Each variety is produced by a single ﬁrm. To enter the industry a ﬁrm pays a ﬁxed cost of entry
 measured in units of the aggregate consumption good. The entrant then draws its productivity
 from a known cumulative Pareto distribution ()=1− − with 1 Upon observing
productivity, ﬁrms can decide to exit or stay and produce.
Technology
Firms can choose between two diﬀerent production technologies  and . Production under tech-
16nology  entails a ﬁxed cost  in terms of the aggregate consumption good and constant marginal








where  and  are wages of skilled () and unskilled ()w o r k e r s , is the ﬁrm’s output and
 ∈ (01). Firms have the option to adopt a skill-intensive technology  which entails a higher
ﬁxed cost but can deliver lower marginal production costs if the equilibrium skill premium is not







where 1, 1∈ (01) and  
Serving The Foreign Market
After learning  the ﬁrm decides whether to sell in the foreign market, which entails an additional
per-period ﬁxed cost of  units of the aggregate consumption good. In addition, exported goods
are subject to per-unit iceberg trade costs so that  units need to be shipped for 1 unit to make it
to the foreign country, with 1.
3.2 Firm Behavior
Proﬁt Maximization
The proﬁt maximizing price is a constant markup over marginal costs. Then, a ﬁrm with produc-





 () i nt h ed o m e s t i cm a r k e ta n da
higher price 
 ()=
 () in the export market. If instead the ﬁrm uses technology ,i tc h a r g e s
lower prices in both markets: 
()=
 () and 
()=






the marginal cost advantage of the high technology.
Firms decide whether to export and adopt technology  by comparing the proﬁts obtained
under each of the four possible choices, which are described below.

















−1 are revenues. Proﬁts if only serving the domestic
26Parameter restrictions that ensure that this is teh case are derived below.






where I used that 
()=−1







− −  (5)





 ()Note that the assumption that both countries are
identical and trade costs are symmetric implies that the price index (P), wages (w and w)a n d







− −  (6)





Exporting and technology choices attaining the highest proﬁts for each productivity level are
represented in Figure 1. The equilibrium depicted obtains when ∗
  ∗
 where ∗
 is deﬁned as






 is deﬁned as the level of productivity above which an exporter ﬁnds adoption of




)]. In Bustos (2010), I show that in this equilibrium ﬁrms
sort into four diﬀerent groups: the least productive ﬁrms ( ∗
) exit, the low productivity ﬁrms
only serve the domestic market and use technology  (∗
  ∗
), the medium productivity
ﬁrms (∗
  ∗
) still use technology  but also export, and the most productive ﬁrms both
export and use technology  (∗
  )Note that in this equilibrium using technology  and only
serving the domestic market is always dominated by some other choice. In addition, as there is
a range of productivity levels where exporting is proﬁtable but adopting technology  is not, the
marginal exporter uses technology In what follows I derive the conditions for this ordering of
cutoﬀs (∗
  ∗
) to be an equilibrium. The opposite case (∗
  ∗
) i so n ew h e r et h ee q u i l i b r i u m
features no exporters using the low technology, which is inconsistent with the empirical ﬁndings I
discuss in next section.
To solve for the industry equilibrium it is useful to state the conditions for exit, entry in the
export market and technology adoption as a functions of the exit cutoﬀ and the skill premium,
which I do next.
Exit












Do not export and
use technology l
Figure 1: Export and Technology Choices
domestic market. Then, the exit cutoﬀ (∗








−  =0  (7)
Exporting
The marginal exporter uses technology l, thus the exporting cutoﬀ (∗





) and can be expressed as a function of ∗











note that as long as  ()
1
−1  1, ∗
  ∗
.Thus, only the most productive ﬁrms export. In







 is only a function of parameters,
thus it is independent of the equilibrium skill premium. This is because the marginal exporter uses
the same technology as the marginal ﬁrm in the industry.
Technology Choice






). By comparing 
 () and 
() as described in equations 5 and 6, one can
see that the beneﬁt of technology adoption is a proportional increase in variable proﬁts by a factor





(−) represents the marginal cost advantage of technology  This beneﬁto f
adopting technology  is increasing in revenues, while its cost [( − 1)] is ﬁxed. Thus, adoption
is characterized by a productivity cutoﬀ ∗
 above which all ﬁrms use technology  ∗
 can be
expressed as a function of ∗




















 is a function of
parameters and the skill premium. This is because technology  uses skilled-labor more intensively,
thus its marginal cost advantage () is decreasing in the skill premium. Then, the fraction of ﬁrms
19adopting the high technology () is a decreasing function of the skill premium.
3.3 Equilibrium





 and the exit cutoﬀ,
∗
This is because all remaining endogenous variables can be written as functions of these two






 are determined by the labor
market clearing and free entry conditions. These two conditions can be solved for sequentially: ﬁrst,






the free entry condition to ﬁnd the equilibrium exit cutoﬀ.
3.3.1 Labor Market









.T o ﬁnd the labor market equilibrium, it is
useful to decompose the aggregate demand for skill in the demand of high technology ﬁrms and



























 () and () are labor demands for each of the three types of ﬁrms described in Figure
1. Analogous deﬁnitions apply to  =  + .
We can derive ﬁrm-level labor demands for skilled and unskilled labor using the total cost
functions for each type of ﬁrm, as detailed in the Appendix. The resulting ﬁrm-level relative
demands for skill are independent of a ﬁrm’s output level (and productivity) once it’s technology













































  Thus, the aggregate relative demand for skill
can be written as a weighted average of the (ﬁrm-level) relative demands for skill of high and low
































This representation of the relative demand for skill is similar to the standard 2x2x2 H-O model.
The only diﬀerence is that here  and  do not represent diﬀerent industries producing goods with
20inherently diﬀerent technologies, but groups of ﬁrms choosing diﬀerent production technologies
within the same industry.
In the Appendix I show that the employment ratio of low and high technology ﬁrms 
 is














and some algebra, the relative demand for skill can be written as a function of the skill premium








































































 are only functions of the
skill premium and parameters (see equations 8 and 9). Thus, the relative demand for skill described
in equations 11 and 12 is only a function of parameters and the skill premium. The equilibrium
in the labor market is represented in Figure 2 where  and  represent the relative demand














 represents their weighted average, where weights are given by employment shares, or relative



















 are downwards sloping. Second, the share of workers employed (or revenues produced) by low
technology ﬁrms rises when the skill premium increases, because their marginal cost disadvantage





is downwards sloping and 











 In the Appendix I show that this equilibrium, where ∗
  ∗












intuition for this restriction on 
 is that if the relative supply of skill is very high, then the skill
premium is low and the cost advantage of technology  is high enough that all exporters adopt it,
thus ∗
 ≤ ∗
 In contrast, if the relative supply of skill is too low, the skill premium is too high,









































Figure 2: Labor Market Equilibrium
3.3.2 Free Entry
In an equilibrium with positive entry, the free entry condition must hold. This condition requires
that the expected value of entry equals the sunk entry cost:






where 1 − (∗
) is the probability of survival and
_
 are per period expected proﬁts of surviving




 are expected proﬁts for surviving ﬁrms that do not export,
 is the fraction of surviving ﬁrms that export but use the low technology, 
 are their expected
proﬁts, and  is the fraction of surviving ﬁrms that export but use the high technology and 

















































−1 T h ef r e ee n t r yc o n d i t i o nc a nb ef u r t h e rs i m p l i ﬁed if ()
is a Pareto distribution with shape parameter k, in which case a solution for the exit cutoﬀ can be
22obtained:
∗









































Note that the exit cutoﬀ ∗
 as expressed in equation 14, is a function of parameters and the
equilibrium skill premium, as is only a function of parameters and  is a function of both
parameters and the skill premium. Then, the solution for equilibrium exit cutoﬀ can be obtained
by plugging in the solution for the equilibrium skill premium obtained above in equation 16. Note
that the exit cutoﬀ is negatively related to the equilibrium skill premium: an increase in the skill
premium reduces the marginal cost advantage of the high technology (), which reduces the fraction
of ﬁrms adopting it () As a result expected proﬁts fall, thus the probability of successful entry
must increase and the exit cutoﬀ decreases.
3.4 Trade Liberalization
In this section I describe the eﬀects of a bilateral trade liberalization where both countries reduce
tariﬀs simultaneously.
Proposition 1. A reduction in variable trade costs ():














(c) increases the share of exporters

  0 and high technology ﬁrms

  0




(e) reduces the export productivity cutoﬀ
∗






Discussion and testable implications
To analyze the eﬀects of trade liberalization on the skill premium it suﬃces to consider its eﬀects
on the labor market equilibrium condition. A reduction in variable trade costs reallocates market
shares from low to high technology ﬁrms, which shifts out the relative demand for skill, as shown













































































Figure 3: Eﬀects of Trade Liberalization on Labor Market Equilibrium (1  0)
induces both high and low technology ﬁrms to use a less skill-intensive production technique. In
addition, as trade liberalization increases export revenues, it makes technology adoption more prof-
itable, inducing some ﬁrms to adopt the high technology. This is because the beneﬁt of adoption
is proportional to revenues, while its cost is ﬁxed. The eﬀects of trade liberalization on the export
and technology adoption decisions are represented in Figure 4. The upper line represents produc-
tivity cutoﬀs to adopt the high technology and to enter the export market before liberalization
(0
 0
), while the lower line represents the cutoﬀs after liberalization (1
 1
). Note that the least
productive ﬁrms, who continue using the low technology ( 1
), respond to the increase in the
skill premium by reducing their skill demand, as shown in Figure 3. Similarly, the most productive
ﬁrms, who continue using the high technology (0
  ), also reduce their their skill demand. In
contrast, ﬁrms in the middle range of the productivity distribution (1
  0
), increase their
skill demand as they adopt the high technology.
4 Empirics
In this section, I start by documenting that that the cross-sectional patterns in the data are consis-














































Figure 4: Eﬀects of Trade Liberalization on Export and Technology Cutoﬀs (1  0)
4.1 Cross Sectional Patterns in the Data
The model predicts that underlying productivity diﬀerences produce a sorting of ﬁrms into three
groups: the low productivity ﬁrms only serve the domestic market and use the low technol-
ogy (∗
  ∗
), the medium productivity ﬁrms still use the low technology but also export
(∗
  ∗
), and the most productive ﬁrms both export and use the high technology (∗
  )
(see Figure 1). In this section I attempt to asses the approximate location of these cutoﬀsb yl o o k i n g
for sizable diﬀerences in the share of exporters, skill and technology intensity across the ﬁrm-size
distribution. Note that as there are several sources of heterogeneity other than productivity in
the data, the exact location of the export and technology adoption cutoﬀsi sl i k e l yt ov a r ya c r o s s
industries or ﬁrms. 27 Thus, I just document how the average probability to export, technology
and skill intensity vary with ﬁrm size. I estimate the average diﬀerences in these outcomes for
each quartile of the initial ﬁrm-size distribution 28 w.r.t. the ﬁrst quartile, through the following




) are likely to diﬀer across
industries with diﬀerent factor intensity as in Bernard, Redding and Schott (2007).I na d d i t i o n ,t h e r ec a nb eo t h e r
sources of heterogeneity across ﬁrms, like diﬀerences in ﬁxed export costs, that aﬀe c te x p o r ts t a t u sb u td on o t
necessarily translate into size diﬀerences. Finally, ﬁrm size is an imprefect measure of productivity.
28As a proxy for unobserved productivity, I use initial ﬁrm size in terms of (log) employment in less than high
school equivalents relative to the 4-digit-industry average, as detailed in the Appendix. Alternatively I used (log)
domestic sales relative to the 4-digit-industry mean as a proxy for initial productivity, with similar but less precise







1992 +  +  (17)
where  indexes ﬁrms,  indexes 4-digit-ISIC industries, 1996 are ﬁrm characteristics in 1996
(export status, skill intensity and spending in technology per worker), 
1992 are dummy variables
taking the value of 1 when ﬁrm  belongs to quartile  of the ﬁrm-size distribution in 1992,29 and
 are 4-digit-ISIC industry dummies. Thus,  corresponds to the diﬀerences in average outcomes
for a ﬁrm in quartile  relative to a ﬁrm in the ﬁrst quartile.
Table 7 reports estimation of equation (17). The probability of exporting, the skilled labor
share and spending in technology per worker increase with ﬁrm size, which is consistent with the
model. Note that both the skilled production labor share and spending in technology per worker
are higher in the third and fourth quartiles than in the ﬁrst two, which suggests that ﬁrms above
median size are, on average, above the productivity cutoﬀ to use technology  after liberalization
(1
 in Figure 4).
4.2 The Eﬀect of Brazil’s Tariﬀs
Tariﬀ reductions can increase the demand for skill through the mechanism highlighted in the model,
namely increased export revenues inducing technology upgrading, or other channels related to the
expansion of exports but not necessarily to the adoption of new production technologies. Thus, in
this section I focus on identifying the causal eﬀects of trade liberalization on the demand for skill,
regardless of the mechanism at work. In next section, I conduct a more detailed analysis of the
data to understand the importance of the mechanism emphasized by the model and identify other
possible mechanisms.
4.2.1 Identiﬁcation of causal eﬀects of Brazil’s tariﬀ reductions
As mentioned above, the estimated eﬀects of tariﬀs on the demand for skill can operate through
increased export revenues inducing technology upgrading as highlighted in the model, or other
channels related to the expansion of exports but not necessarily to the adoption of new production
technologies. Thus, in this section I focus on identifying the causal eﬀects of trade liberalization on
the demand for skill while I leave the more detailed exploration of particular mechanisms for next
section. I estimate the eﬀects of tariﬀs on the skilled labor share separately for diﬀerent quantiles of
29Outcomes in 1996 are related to measures if ﬁrm size in 1992 to avoid simultaneity problems. These are particu-
larly important for the skilled labor share and spending in technology per worker measures, as both have employment
as a denominator, which is the same variable used to measure ﬁrm size. Then, relating 1996 outcomes to 1996 ﬁrm
size would lead to a negative bias on the coeﬃcient of ﬁrm-size if there is measurement error in employment.
26the ﬁrm-size distribution. In this section I report results obtained when dividing ﬁrms in only two
groups: below and above median size, as ﬁner partitions provide similar point estimates but bigger
standard errors. The median is a useful cutoﬀ to identify the causal eﬀects of tariﬀ reductions on
skill upgrading because 76% of the ﬁrms above the median size export while only 38% of the ﬁrms
below median size do. Thus, we expect the reduction in Brazil’s tariﬀs to have a direct eﬀect on
ﬁrms above median size, while the rest are mostly aﬀected by general equilibrium changes in the
skill premium.
Ie s t i m a t et h ee ﬀects of the reduction in Brazil’s tariﬀso nﬁrms below and above median size






=  + ∆ +  (∆ × )+ + ∆ (18)
where  denotes ﬁrms,  denotes 4-digit-ISIC industries; ∆ is the change in Brazil’s tariﬀs during
the period 1992-1996, which is given by minus its initial-level; and  is a dummy variable taking
the value of 1 when ﬁrms are above median size.
Equation (18) exploits the diﬀerential changes in Brazil’s tariﬀs across 4-digit-ISIC industries
to identify the causal eﬀect of a reduction in trade costs on skill intensity. These tariﬀ changes
are likely to be exogenous with respect to the outcome analyzed, the change in skill intensity
between 1992 and 1996, because they are predetermined by the 1991 m.f.n. tariﬀ levels in Brazil.30
Thus, tariﬀ changes can’t be driven by contemporaneous political pressures or shocks to industrial
performance. In addition, as 1991 m.f.n. tariﬀs respond to Brazil’s worldwide trade policy, they
are unlikely to be targeted to Argentina’s comparative advantage.31 Still, Brazil’s initial tariﬀ
structure is correlated with some industry characteristics and omitting them could be an important
source of bias. This is why I estimate equation (18) in ﬁrst diﬀerences so that constant industry
characteristics are diﬀerenced-out. Still, if industries with diﬀerent initial characteristics were on
diﬀerent trends, Brazil’s tariﬀs could capture some omitted industry-level-time-varying variable. I
address this problem by including in the diﬀerenced equations 2-digit-ISIC-industry dummies and
4-digit-ISIC-industry-level controls for industry characteristics that are likely to inﬂuence trade
policy like the elasticity of demand, capital and skill intensity.32
An additional issue is that Brazil’s tariﬀs might be correlated with changes in Argentina’s tariﬀs
during this period if both countries had a similar structure of protection. To address this concern
30As discussed in section 1.1. tariﬀ reductions were programmed in 1991, and reach a level of zero for all industries
in 1995. For a more detailed discussion of the implementation of MERCOSUR see Bustos (forthcoming).
31Argentina’s share on Brazil’s trade was only 7.7% in 1991.
32These industry characteristics are measured with U.S. data to avoid endogeneity problems.
27I control for the change in Argentina’s tariﬀs with respect to the world and Brazil for both ﬁnal
goods and intermediate inputs.33
4.2.2 Results
Estimation results indicate that ﬁrms above median size were induced to upgrade skill by the reduc-
tion in Brazil’s tariﬀs, while ﬁrms below median size were induced to downgrade skill. Estimation
of equation (18) is reported in Table 8 where Column 1 includes no controls while the rest of the
columns add the controls described in the previous sub-section. The ﬁrst row reports estimation
of  which measures the average eﬀect of Brazil’s tariﬀs on the skilled labor share for ﬁrms below
median size. The second row reports , which measures the diﬀerential eﬀect of Brazil’s tariﬀso n
the skilled labor share of ﬁrms above median size (the total eﬀect for this group is  + ). The es-
timated coeﬃcients in the baseline speciﬁcation,34 reported in column (2), are  = 3.999 (t =2.47)
and  = -8.654 (t=3.36). These coeﬃcients imply that the average reduction in Brazil’s tariﬀs
(23 percentage points) induced an 8% reduction in the average skilled labor share for ﬁrms below
median size and a 6% increase for ﬁrms above median size. Another way of reading the results is
that in a sector with the average reduction in Brazil’s tariﬀs, big ﬁrms increased the skilled labor
share 1.98 percentage points faster than small ﬁrms. This amounts to a 35% increase in the skill
intensity gap between big and small ﬁrms.
T h er e s to fh ec o l u m n si nT a b l e8s h o wt h a te s t i mation results are robust to the inclusion
of changes in Argentina’s output and input tariﬀs w.r.t. the world and Brazil and 4-digit-ISIC
industry characteristics. Results are also robust to including interactions of all these industry-level
variables with the dummy variable indicating whether a ﬁrm is above median size (). Finally,
column (8) shows that the result that ﬁrms above median size upgrade skill faster in industries
with bigger reductions in tariﬀs is robust to the inclusion of 4-digit-ISIC industry dummies.
I performed some additional robustness checks for the results reported in Table 8. First, I
estimated an equation similar to (18) but instead of using a dummy variable indicating ﬁrm size,
I directly interacted the change in tariﬀsw i t hﬁrm-size, as reported in Appendix Table A.3. The
estimated coeﬃcients on the change in Brazil’s tariﬀsa n dﬁrm-size imply that eﬀect of tariﬀ reduc-
tions changes sign around the median, conﬁrming the results reported in Table 8. Finally, I also
33As Argentina’s m.f.n tariﬀs in 1992 were the basis for MERCOSUR tariﬀ reductions, it is hard to distinguish the
eﬀect of the reduction of tariﬀs with respect to Brazil from changes of tariﬀs with respect to the rest of the world,
thus I control for them separately.
34The baseline or preferred speciﬁcation is the one that includes controls for 2-digit-ISIC industry dummies. This
is because it controls for diﬀerential industry trends at the 2-digit aggregation level, and does not include changes
(or levels) of Argentina’s tariﬀs which are more likley to be endogenous to Argentina’s industry characteristics than
the initial level of Brazil’s tariﬀs.
28estimated equation (18) replacing the outcome of interest for the log ratio of skilled to unskilled
labor, obtaining very similar results not reported in the paper but available upon request.
4.2.3 Mechanism
In this section, I investigate whether the reduction in Brazil’s tariﬀs induced skill upgrading through
the mechanism stressed by the model: adoption of skill-biased production technologies. For this
purpose, I separate the skilled labor share in its production () and non-production ()c o m p o -




Skill in Production and Non-production Activities
Ie s t i m a t et h ee ﬀects of the reduction in Brazil’s tariﬀs on skill upgrading for each quartile of the

















 + ∆ (19)
where 
 are dummy variables taking the value of 1 when ﬁrm  belongs to quartile  of the ﬁrm
size distribution in 1992. Table 9 reports results from estimation of equation (19). In Panel A the
outcome is the skilled labor share, as in Table 8. Panels B and C report results for the skilled
production and non-production labor shares separately. Panel A conﬁrms the results reported in
the previous section: ﬁrms below median size downgrade skill and ﬁrms below upgrade, with eﬀects
on the third and fourth quartiles being of similar size. In Panel B, where the outcome is the skilled
production labor share, the reported coeﬃcient on the change in Brazil’s tariﬀs () is always positive
[ = 3.03 (t=2.66) in Panel B column 2] and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. Thus, the reduction
in Brazil’s tariﬀs induced ﬁrms below median size to reduce the skilled production labor share.
The reported coeﬃcients on the interaction between Brazil’s tariﬀs and the third and fourth size
quartiles (3 and 4) measure the diﬀerential eﬀect of the change in Brazil’s tariﬀso nt h e s eq u a r t i l e s
relative to ﬁrms below median size. This diﬀerence is always negative and statistically signiﬁcant
[3= -7.34 (t=3.06) and 4= -4.86 (t=2.75) in Panel B column 2]. Note that the point estimate
for the fourth quartile is smaller than for the third, although the diﬀerence is not statistically
signiﬁcant. Panel C reports estimation of the eﬀect of tariﬀs on the skilled-non production labor
share. The only robust result in Panel C is that in sectors where Brazil’s tariﬀsf a l l ,ﬁrms in the
















. Unfortunately, estimates of the eﬀects of tariﬀs







294th quartile upgrade skill faster than ﬁrms below median size. This diﬀerence is always negative
and statistically signiﬁcant [4 = -2.99 (t=1.97) in Panel Column 2]. The point estimate on ﬁrms
below median size () is positive but only statistically signiﬁcant when the change in Argentina’s
tariﬀs w.r.t. Brazil is included as a control.
Taken altogether, the results reported in Table 9 indicate that the reduction in Brazil’s tariﬀs
induced ﬁrms below median size to reduce skill intensity in production activities. In turn, ﬁrms in
the third quartile of the ﬁrm size distribution were induced to upgrade skill in production activities.
Finally, tariﬀ reductions also induced ﬁrms in the fourth quartile to upgrade skill overall, although
with a relative stronger emphasis on non-production activities.
Discussion
The model’s predictions are broadly consistent with the ﬁrm-level responses to trade liberalization
reported above. First, as trade liberalization increases the equilibrium skill premium, the model
predicts that ﬁrms still using the old technology ( 1
) downgrade skill. This consistent with
the data, as ﬁrms below median size, who have a lower level of technology spending than ﬁrms
above median size after trade liberalization (see Table 7), downgrade skill faster in industries where
tariﬀs fall more. Second, the ﬁnding that the eﬀect of Brazil’s tariﬀs on the skilled production
labor share is stronger in the third than in the fourth quartile is consistent with the model’s
prediction that reductions in trade costs induce ﬁrms in the upper-middle range of the productivity
distribution (1
  0
) to upgrade technology and skill. Finally, the model also predicts
that the most productive ﬁrms that were already using the high technology before liberalization
(0
  ) downgrade skill when faced with increases in the skill premium (see Figure 4). I did not
ﬁnd support for this prediction in the data, as ﬁner partitions of the upper-range of the ﬁrm-size
distribution tend to produce imprecise estimates. In addition, in Bustos (2011) I report that ﬁrms
in the fourth quartile do not respond to tariﬀ cuts by increasing spending in technology.36 This
ﬁnding, coupled with the fact that ﬁrms in teh fourth quartile have the highest level of spending
in technology per worker after liberalization (Table 7) suggests that most of them were above the
adoption cutoﬀ before, or regardless of, liberalization (0
  ). But then the model predicts that
they should behave as the least productive ﬁrms and downgrade skill in production activities. This
is because in the model, the elasticity of the relative demand for skill is the same for the high and
low technologies. The data suggests that this is not a correct representation (Table 9, Panel B).
Instead, a model where the high technology displays a lower elasticity of substitution than the low
technology would ﬁt the data better. In such a model, high technology ﬁrms would not respond to
an increase in the skill premium by reducing their skill intensity as much as low technology ﬁrms. In
36I summarize these ﬁndings in Appendix Table A4.
30addition, ﬁrms in the fourth quartile respond to tariﬀ cuts by increasing the skilled non-production
labor share (Table 9, Panel C) which is by deﬁnition unrelated to changes in production technology.
As 86% of ﬁrms in the fourth quartile export after liberalization, this ﬁnding suggests that entry or
expansion of sales in export markets per se induces ﬁrms to upgrade skill, which would be consistent
with models where foreign market access costs are more skill intensive than domestic market access
costs, like the one presented in Matsuyama (2007).
4.2.4 Aggregation
In this section I use the estimates of the eﬀects of tariﬀso nﬁrm’s skilled labor shares to calculate
how much of the aggregate increase in the employment share of skilled workers can be explained by
the reduction in Brazil’s tariﬀs. For this purpose, I use the total eﬀects of tariﬀ reductions on skill
intensity reported in Table 8, which include the mechanism highlighted by the model and possibly
others. Thus, the results should be interpreted as the overall eﬀect of Brazil’s tariﬀ reductions
regardless of the mechanism at work. Still, as discussed in the previous section, most of the eﬀect
of tariﬀs occurred within production labor and is broadly consistent with the predictions of the
model. Thus, it is possible that the eﬀects of the mechanism proposed by the model are not much
smaller than the total eﬀects.
The main challenge in obtaining an aggregate estimate is that ﬁrms below and above median
size behave diﬀerently, thus we need to weight their impact on the aggregate demand by their





































where  and  denote the sets of ﬁrms below and above median size, respectively. Next I use the
baseline estimated average eﬀect of Brazil’s tariﬀso ns m a l lﬁrms [ as reported in Column 2 of



















 is approximated by the initial share of
total employment of small ﬁrms. Analogous approximations are used for the terms corresponding
to the set of big ﬁrms.
I ﬁnd that the reduction in Brazil’s tariﬀs can explain approximately 32% of the total increase
in the skilled labor employment share, which is 2.6 percentage points in the period 1992-1996
(see Table 1.2). The contribution of small ﬁrms to the change in the skilled labor share is -0.11
percentage points, as the initial employment share of small ﬁrms is 0.12, and their average change
in the skilled labor share induced by tariﬀ cuts is -0.91 percentage points (3.999 × -0.23). The
31contribution of big ﬁrms to the change in the skilled labor share is 0.93 percentage points, as their
initial employment share is 0.88, and their average change in the skilled labor share induced by
tariﬀ cuts is 1.06 percentage points ( -4.655 × -0.23).
5C o n c l u s i o n
The ﬁndings reported in this paper suggest that ﬁrms can respond to trade liberalization by in-
creasing the skill intensity of production technology. This implies that trade can have a role in
explaining not only the increases in the relative demand for skill that are driven by reallocations
of labor towards skill-intensive sectors or ﬁrms, but also increases in skill intensity within ﬁrms.
This can substantially increase the estimates of the aggregate eﬀects of trade liberalization on the
skill premium, specially in developing countries where several studies document little reallocation
of labor across sectors.
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35Theory Appendix
This appendix contains the derivations of expressions in the theory section of the paper and the
p r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n1 .
Labor Market Equilibrium
Derivation of ﬁrm-level labor demands
Firm-level labor demands can be obtained by diﬀerentiating their total cost functions w.r.t.
wages (Shepard’s lemma ).There are three ﬁrm types in equilibrium: ﬁrms that only serve the
domestic market, ﬁrms that export but use the low technology and ﬁrms that export and use the
























We can obtain the demand for skilled and unskilled

































Labor demands for the remaining two types of ﬁrms can be obtained in a similar way. Total






 ()  
i













Using Shepard’s lemma and 
 ()=−
 () we obtain 
 ()=
 ()(1+1−) and 
 ()=

















































36Derivations for aggregate demand for skill
In this section I provide some details on the derivations required to obtain equations 11 and 12.































































Start by using the solutions for 
 () 














































































































































































 if the relative






















T h i sc a nb es e e nf r o me q u a t i o n1 1w h e r et h eﬁrst term on the right is 1


and the second term in













 0 note that the ﬁrst term of 
 as described by equation 12, is increasing
in the skill premium because 
 

 0The second term is also increasing in the skill premium












  0 (see equations 8 and 9).
2. Equations 8 and 9 imply that    is an equilibrium only if the equilibrium skill
premium is not too low, as otherwise all exporters would adopt the high technology. In addition,
for technology adoption to be proﬁtable for some ﬁrms, we need 1These two conditions imply
















































to be an equilibrium, the relative supply of skill must




















in the relative demand for skill (equation 11).




































In this section I show how to obtain the solution for the exit cutoﬀ stated in equation 14 from




















































− −  − ( − 1) (A1)
















































































































































































To simplify the free entry condition further, we can use the fact that under a Pareto distribution

















 ) = 
−(−1) for  =  to obtain:
µ
 − 1
 −  +1
¶
[ +  +  ( − 1)] = 
 (A2)
from which the solution for the exit cutoﬀ given in equation 14 is obtained.
Derivations for section 3.4 Trade Liberalization
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 .





To analyze the eﬀects of trade liberalization on the skill premium it suﬃces to consider its eﬀects
on the labor market equilibrium condition. For a given skill premium, the only component of






(see equation 11)Thus, trade liberalization increases the demand for
skill only if it reallocates market shares from low to high technology ﬁrms. Note that this does
not immediately follow from the reallocation of market shares towards exporters because there are









.S t i l l ,i fﬁrm-productivity follows a Pareto
distribution we can show that, for a given skill premium, a reduction in tariﬀs increases the relative
































37The steps required to obtain this expression for

 are similar to the ones followed above to obtain expected
proﬁts. Detailed derivations are available upon request.
40Note that, as we are calculating the derivative of 





















−1  0 as 1, 1 and 1Then,





































 is the same as the sign of the the derivative of the
second term in the R.H.S. of equation 21, which for convenience I name Υ Then, diﬀerentiate Υ




























After some algebra, one can show that Υ





−1  1 that is, if not all ﬁrms export.
Step 2. We just established that reduction in trade costs increases the relative revenues of high-








  0 Then, when trade costs fall the relative
demand for skill depicted in Figure 2 shifts out which results in a higher equilibrium skill premium
because the relative supply of skill is vertical.
































































































(c) A reduction in trade costs increases:
-The share of exporters,

  0This can be directly seen on equation 15.
-The share of high technology ﬁrms,

  0
 has a direct negative eﬀect on the solution for  d e s c r i b e di ne q u a t i o n1 6b ut an indirect positive
eﬀect through  This is because the reduction in tariﬀs increases the skill premium reducing the
cost advantage of high technology ﬁrms. Still, we can show that the direct eﬀect must dominate.
41To see this, suppose it was not the case. Then,  f a l l sa st r a d ec o s t sf a l l :

 ≥ 0.B u tw es h o w














 ≥ 0 start from the expression for relative revenues in equation







































 ≥ 0 all terms in the R.H.S. of the equation above increase as trade costs fall.
This is because: 
 increases, then  falls and thus −1−1

































 ≥ 0, but this contradicts point
( b )j u s ta b o v e .




Proof: Suppose that the opposite is true, ∗
 f a l l sa st r a d ec o s t sf a l l . T h e n ,t h es o l u t i o nf o r∗

described in equation 14 implies that expected ﬁxed costs, given by  +

 + ( − 1) must fall.
But as the fraction of exporters  increases when trade costs fall (see equation 15) this implies
that the fraction of ﬁrms using the high technology  must fall, which contradicts point (c) above.





To see this, start from the deﬁnition of ∗
 as a function of ∗







and the solution for ∗





 +  +

















increases when  falls because 1−
1+1− increases and  falls.
Then, as  and







To see this, start from the deﬁnition of ∗
 as a function of ∗







and the solution for ∗







 +(  − 1)
¸ 1



















 0 Where the last inequality






  0, which we proved to be the case in point b) above. To see

















Then, as  falls, 
 increasesfalls, −1−1







must fall so that that





















Educational Categories   
Engineers   7,416 8,414 0.135
Other college  13,318 13,680 0.027
Technicians  21,623 23,050 0.066
High school graduates and below  272,077 249,307 -0.084
Total  314,434 294,451 -0.064




Relative Employment of Skilled Workers 
 1992 1996 
Percent 
Change 
College equivalents  (S) 38,271 40,788  0.066
Less than high school equivalents (U) 300,240 275,556  -0.082
Skilled/Unskilled (S/U)             0.127            0.148   0.161
Note: This table reports the total number of skilled workers (college plus technicians) and unskilled workers 
(high school plus primary school and below) expressed as  less than high school equivalents by weighting 




Employment Share of Skilled Workers in Efficiency Units  
 1992 1996 
Percent 
Change 
Employment of skilled workers (S . w) 77,078 82,148  0.066
Total employment (S w + U) 377,317 357,703  -0.052
Employment share of skilled workers S . w /(S w + U)                  0.204              0.230   0.124
Note: This table reports the total number of skilled workers (college plus technicians) and unskilled 
workers (high school plus primary school and below) expressed as  primary school equivalents by 
weighting them by the corresponding 1992 returns to education. Same sample of firms as Tables 1.1 and 
1.2.  
 Table 2  
Employment Share of Skilled Workers by Occupational Category 
 1992 1996 
Percent 
Change 
Production 0.156 0.177  0.129
Non production  0.364 0.393  0.079
R&D 0.735 0.759  0.033
Total   0.221 0.248  0.123
Note: Same sample of firms as Table 1.3. Totals differ because there is a default category of workers 




Decomposition of the change in the Employment Share of Skilled Labor by Occupational 
Category 
  Within Between Total
Production 0.065 -0.011 0.054
Non production  0.035 0.019 0.054
R&D 0.002 0.013 0.015
Total 0.102 0.020 0.123
Note: Same sample of firms as Table 1.3. Totals differ because there is a default category of workers 




Decomposition of the change in the Employment Share of Skilled Labor by Sectors and 
Firms 
  Within Between Total
Industries at 2-digit-ISIC  0.111 0.014 0.124
Industries at 4-digit-ISIC  0.110 0.015 0.124
Firms 0.106 0.019 0.124
Note: Same sample of firms as Table 1.3. 
 Table 5 
Technology and Skill Upgrading  
Dependent variable: change (Δ) in employment share of skilled labor 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Δ  log  (Spending  in  Technology) 0.544  0.531        
  [0.164]*** [0.162]***       
Product and process innovation index      1.448  1.071         
     [0.486]*** [0.503]**      
Product  innovation  index       1.483  1.185    
       [0.462]*** [0.483]**    
Process  innovation  index         1.120  0.764 
         [0.449]**  [0.461]* 
2-digit-ISIC-Industry  dummies     Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes 
Observations  880  880  1280 1280 1291 1291 1298 1298 
R-squared  0.01 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.04 
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets. * indicates significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%             
   Table 6 
Export Status and Skill Upgrading 













Firm Characteristic         
Sales  1.795 1.078  0.178 0.241  1359 
   [0.090]*** [0.103]***  [0.040]*** [0.049]***   
Employment  1.530 0.917  0.015 0.158  1359 
   [0.075]*** [0.087]***  [0.026]  [0.034]***   
Skilled Labor Share  5.113 1.316  1.375 1.569  1359 
   [1.043]*** [1.100]  [0.354]*** [0.437]***   
Skilled Production  Labor Share   1.839 0.301  0.629 0.585  1359 
  [0.688]*** [0.682]  [0.299]**  [0.297]**   
Skilled Non Production  Labor   2.377 0.589  0.747 0.632  1359 
Share  [0.658]*** [0.667]  [0.281]*** [0.269]**   
Spending in Technology  0.516 0.087  0.183 0.211  1359 
per worker  [0.161]*** [0.102]  [0.133]  [0.069]***   
Spending in Technology  0.343 0.191  0.292 0.393  880 
per worker (logs)  [0.151]** [0.176]  [0.106]***  [0.118]***   
Note: Robust Standard Errors in Brackets. * indicates significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Exporter premia are estimated from a regression of the form: ln Yij = α1  NEij + α2  EEij + α3 ENij + Ij+ εij  where i 
indexes firms, j indexes 4-digit-ISIC  industries; NE are new exporters (226 firms), EE are continuing exporters ( 552 
firms), EN are firms that exported in 1992  but didn’t in 1996 (25 firms) and the reference category relative to which 
differences are estimated is non exporters (556 firms); I are industry dummies, and Y is the firm characteristic for 
which the differences are estimated. Table 7 
Cross Sectional Patterns in the Data  
 
  Export Status  Skill Intensity  Technology 











per worker  
Spending in 
Technology 








2nd size quartile  0.215 5.193  2.369  2.277 0.128 0.088 0.109 0.140 
 [0.035]***  [1.146]*** [0.749]***  [0.695]***  [0.156] [0.156] [0.022]***  [0.025]*** 
3rd size quartile  0.389 6.684  3.875  2.423 0.304 0.503 0.163 0.199 
 [0.033]***  [1.182]*** [0.801]***  [0.646]***  [0.139]** [0.147]***  [0.022]***  [0.024]*** 
4th size quartile  0.576  10.383  5.216  4.346 0.591 0.940 0.283 0.323 
 [0.030]***  [1.169]*** [0.799]***  [0.680]***  [0.131]*** [0.145]*** [0.023]*** [0.024]*** 
4-digit-ISIC industry dummies  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  1359  1359 1359  1359 1359 1132 1291 1298 
            
Average 1st size quartile  0.274  11.319  5.881  4.467 0.410  -1.900 0.226 0.225 
 [0.024]  [0.872]  [0.547]  [0.457]  [0.093] [0.113] [0.014] [0.016] 
Notes: robust standard errors in brackets.  * indicates significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  Coefficients report differences in 1996 outcomes (indicated in 
columns)  of firms belonging to the quartiles indicated in each row w.r.t. firms belonging to the first size quartile. The bottom two rows of the table report the mean of each outcome for 
firms in the first quartile, as reference.    Firm size is measured as the (log) number of employees in efficiency units relative to the 4-digit-ISIC industry mean for the initial year in the 
sample,  1992.      
   Table 8 
Effect of Brazil’s Tariff Reductions on Skill Upgrading 
 
Dependent variable:  Skilled Labor Share 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Change in Brazil’s tariffs     4.885 3.999 4.905 5.791 6.246 6.019   
  [1.947]**  [1.621]**  [1.835]*** [1.923]*** [1.775]*** [1.927]***   
      Above median size   -8.141 -8.654 -8.713  -10.181 -8.621 -7.840 -7.944 
  [2.617]*** [2.576]*** [2.609]*** [2.849]*** [2.536]*** [2.699]*** [2.123]*** 
Above median size  -1.274 -1.504 -1.504 -8.081 -1.486 -7.543 -1.324 
 [0.742]*  [0.731]**  [0.745]**  [3.880]** [0.734]** [3.914]*  [0.603]** 
Change in Arg.’s output tariffs w.r.t. World     3.029  3.988     
     [5.597]  [7.619]     
      Above median size       -2.744     
      [10.540]     
Change in Arg.’s input tariffs w.r.t. World     5.737  9.517     
     [11.870]  [17.215]     
      Above median size       -5.290     
      [22.763]     
Change in Arg.’s output tariffs w.r.t. Brazil       1.578  7.539   
 

     [4.510]  [7.169]   
     Above median size        -13.628   
        [10.794]   
Change in Arg.’s input tariffs w.r.t. Brazil       -29.081  -35.965   
 

     [9.369]***  [11.364]***   
     Above median size        16.643   
        [14.439]   
Demand elasticity      0.136 0.157 0.199 0.254   
 

    [0.085]  [0.106]  [0.079]**  [0.111]**   
     Above median size       -0.039   -0.103   
       [0.149]   [0.167]   
U.S. Capital intensity      -0.169 -0.739 -0.295 -0.968   
 

    [0.477] [0.499] [0.401] [0.513]*   
     Above median size       1.107   1.315   
       [0.664]*   [0.740]*   
U.S. Skill intensity      0.644 1.373 0.684 1.157   
 

    [0.606] [0.808]*  [0.694] [0.816]   
     Above median size       -1.487   -0.886   
       [1.058]   [1.111]   
2-digit-ISIC industry dummies   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes   
4-digit-ISIC  industry  dummies         Yes 
Observations  1359 1359 1327 1327 1321 1321 1359 
R-squared 0.01  0.05  0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.10 
Notes: standard errors are clustered at the 4-digit-ISIC industry level.  * indicates significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  Firm size is measured as the (log) number of 
employees measured in efficiency units relative to the 4-digit-SIC mean. Table 9 
Effect of Brazil’s Tariff Reductions on Skill Upgrading in Production and Non-production Activities 
  1 2 3 4 5 
Panel A: dependent variable is  Skilled Labor Share 
Change in Brazil’s tariffs     4.885  4.001  4.902  6.287   
 [1.949]**  [1.623]**  [1.825]***  [1.782]***   
     3rd size quartile  -8.315 -9.013 -9.064 -8.887 -8.292 
  [3.346]**  [3.340]*** [3.399]*** [3.265]*** [3.007]*** 
     4th size quartile  -7.863 -8.160 -8.245 -8.244 -7.445 
  [2.706]*** [2.645]*** [2.668]*** [2.652]*** [2.349]*** 
3rd size quartile  -1.435  -1.764  -1.749  -1.723  -1.622 
 [0.866]  [0.871]**  [0.893]*  [0.875]*  [0.795]** 
4th size quartile  -1.085  -1.208 -1.231 -1.224 -0.994 
  [0.812] [0.785] [0.795] [0.790] [0.677] 
Change in Arg.’s output tariffs w.r.t. World      2.855     
     [5.619]     
Change in Arg.’s input tariffs w.r.t. World      5.635     
     [11.834]     
Change in Arg.’s output tariffs w.r.t. Brazil        1.463   
       [4.542]   
Change in Arg.’s input tariffs w.r.t. Brazil        -29.039   
       [9.451]***   
Panel B: dependent variable is  Skilled Production Labor Share 
Change in Brazil’s tariffs     3.645  3.032  3.298  3.303   
  [1.434]** [1.140]***  [1.362]** [1.429]**   
     3rd size quartile  -7.128 -7.341 -7.370 -7.171 -6.874 
  [2.611]*** [2.399]*** [2.443]*** [2.350]*** [2.250]*** 
     4th size quartile  -4.539 -4.856 -4.992 -5.050 -4.532 
  [1.839]**  [1.766]*** [1.782]*** [1.754]*** [1.584]*** 
3rd size quartile  -1.309  -1.457  -1.458  -1.417  -1.327 
  [0.667]*  [0.647]** [0.661]** [0.642]** [0.615]** 
4th size quartile  -1.041  -1.108 -1.152 -1.164 -0.956 
  [0.556]*  [0.533]** [0.536]** [0.523]** [0.466]** 
Change in Arg.’s output tariffs w.r.t. World      2.340     
     [3.399]     
Change in Arg.’s input tariffs w.r.t. World      5.109     
     [6.932]     
Change in Arg.’s output tariffs w.r.t. Brazil        5.942   
       [3.462]*   
Change in Arg.’s input tariffs w.r.t. Brazil        -24.284   
       [7.945]***   
Panel C: dependent variable is  Skilled Non- Production Labor Share 
Change in Brazil’s tariffs     0.862  0.884  1.595  2.957   
  [1.065] [0.825] [1.031] [1.321]**  
       3rd size quartile   -1.403 -1.646 -1.757 -1.756 -1.409 
  [1.600] [1.598] [1.606] [1.571] [1.699] 
       4th size quartile   -2.879 -2.998 -2.988 -2.921 -2.746 
  [1.529]* [1.521]* [1.538]* [1.532]* [1.520]* 
3rd size quartile  -0.059  -0.176  -0.208  -0.218  -0.160 
  [0.412] [0.397] [0.405] [0.406] [0.453] 
4th size quartile  -0.044  -0.105 -0.099 -0.078 -0.062 
  [0.437] [0.428] [0.436] [0.437] [0.431] 
Change in Arg.’s output tariffs w.r.t. World      0.236     
     [3.825]     
Change in Arg.’s input tariffs w.r.t. World      1.411     
     [6.203]     
Change in Arg.’s output tariffs w.r.t. Brazil        -3.999   
       [3.808]   
Change in Arg.’s input tariffs w.r.t. Brazil        -6.418   
       [6.099]   
Additional controls       
4-digit-ISIC industry characteristics      Yes  Yes   
2-digit-ISIC industry dummies   Yes Yes Yes   
4-digit-ISIC  industry  dummies       Yes 
Observations  1359 1359 1327 1321 1359 
Notes: standard errors are clustered at the 4-digit-ISIC industry level.  * indicates significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
Firm size is measured as the (log) number of employees measured in efficiency units relative to the 4-digit-SIC mean.      Data Appendix 
This appendix contains supplementary tables A1 to A4. 
 
Table A1 
Brazil and Argentina’s m.f.n Tariffs  
  Average Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum  Industries 
Brazil’s m.f.n. tariffs in 1991      0.29  0.17  0.00  0.84  101 
Brazil’s m.f.n. tariffs in 1992  0.24  0.13  0.00  0.63  104 
 
Argentina’s m.f.n tariffs in 1992        
Outputs  0.13 0.06 0.00 0.22 102 
Inputs  0.11 0.03 0.01 0.17 101 
 
Change in Arg.’s tariffs w.r.t. the world 1992-1996        
Outputs  0.01 0.05  -0.10 0.14 104 
Inputs  0.01 0.02  -0.03 0.06 101 





ETIA Panel, Year 1992.  
   Non-exporters Exporters  All  Observations
Employment  122.573 378.825 231.372  1359 
   [9.102] [25.070]  [12.346]   
Employment in efficiency units   142.404 460.931 277.643  1359 
   [10.149] [31.169] [15.077]   
Sales  9,606.65 40,710.27  22,812.53  1359 
   [689.557] [4,555.679]  [2,017.160]   
Skill intensity  11.782 19.289 14.969  1359 
   [0.547] [0.716] [0.449]   
Spending in technology per worker  0.306 0.856 0.539  1359 
   [0.036] [0.112] [0.052]   
Investment in capital goods per worker   3.312 3.506 3.394  1359 
   [0.848] [0.459] [0.525]   
Spending in technology per worker / ST>0  0.563 1.042 0.816  899 
   [0.063] [0.134] [0.077]   
Investment in capital goods per worker / I>0  5.138 4.162 4.659  990 
   [1.309] [0.540] [0.717]   
Index of product and process innovation  0.316 0.467 0.381  1280 
   [0.011] [0.013] [0.009]   
Index of product innovation  0.305 0.449 0.367  1291 
   [0.011] [0.013] [0.009]   
Index of production process innovation  0.327 0.485 0.395  1298 
   [0.012] [0.014] [0.009]   
Export share of sales/ Exports >0   0.16    577 
    [0.010]     
Notes: Standard errors of  means in parentheses. Employment in number of workers, employment in primary school 
equivalents in number of less than complete high school workers, sales in thousands of 1992 pesos (exchange rate: 1 
peso / US$ 1),    spending in technology per worker and investment in capital goods per worker in thousands of 1992 
pesos per worker in efficiency units. Further detail on dataset and variable definitions in section 1.2.1 of text. 
 Table A.3 
Effect of Brazil’s Tariff Reductions on Skill Upgrading 
 
Dependent variable:  Skilled Labor Share  
  1  2 3 4 5 6 7  8 
Change in Brazil’s tariffs      0.763  14.664 14.696 14.856 16.468 15.622 13.516   
 [1.310]  [4.975]***  [4.490]***  [4.627]*** [5.466]*** [4.306]*** [5.295]**   
        Firm size      -2.867 -3.050 -2.938 -3.289 -2.865 -2.363  -2.842 
    [0.888]*** [0.842]*** [0.849]*** [1.009]*** [0.843]*** [1.069]** [0.848]*** 
Firm size 0.355  -0.311  -0.406  -0.381  -1.580 -0.355 -1.398  -0.365 
 [0.137]**  [0.286]  [0.277]  [0.283]  [1.601] [0.281] [1.558]  [0.253] 
Change in Arg.’s output tariffs w.r.t. World       1.813  6.760      
 

     [5.671]  [20.244]      
        Firm size        -1.211      
        [4.218]      
Change in Arg.’s input tariffs w.r.t. World       5.341  9.199      
       [12.195]  [47.446]      
       Firm size         -0.759      
        [8.341]      
Change in Arg.’s output tariffs w.r.t. Brazil         2.854  24.446   
         [4.472]  [19.559]   
       Firm size           -5.027   
          [4.294]   
Change in Arg.’s input tariffs w.r.t. Brazil         -28.602  -49.583   
         [9.384]***  [31.027]   
       Firm size           4.849   
          [6.180]   
Demand elasticity        0.108 0.149 0.169 0.350  
       [0.088]  [0.252]  [0.084]**  [0.277]   
       Firm size         -0.008   -0.038   
        [0.052]   [0.055]   
U.S. Capital intensity        -0.154 -1.110 -0.289 -1.544  
        [0.499] [1.326] [0.430] [1.449]  
      Firm size         0.187   0.250   
        [0.245]   [0.275]   
U.S. Skill intensity        0.511 1.973 0.458 0.906  
        [0.621] [2.788] [0.701] [2.464]  
      Firm size         -0.304   -0.069   
        [0.542]   [0.498]   
2-digit-ISIC industry dummies     Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes   
4-digit-ISIC  industry  dummies           Yes 
Observations  1359  1359 1359 1327 1327 1321 1321  1359 
R-squared 0.01  0.02  0.05  0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06  0.10 
Notes: standard errors are clustered at the 4-digit-ISIC industry level.  * indicates significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  Firm size is measured as the (log) number of 
employees measured in efficiency units.            Table A.4 
Effect of Brazil’s Tariff Reductions on Entry in the Export Market and Technology Adoption 
 
Dependent variable indicated in column headings.  
  1 2 3 4  5  6 






per worker  
Spending in 
Technology 








Change in Brazil’s tariffs             
          
    1st or 2nd size quartiles  -0.301 -0.111 -0.589 -0.812 -0.794 -0.117 
  [0.124]** [0.129]  [0.412]  [0.499] [0.491] [0.114] 
    3rd size quartile  -0.756 -0.555 -1.924 -2.246 -2.342 -0.336 
  [0.173]*** [0.157]*** [0.577]*** [0.589]*** [0.615]***  [0.135]** 
    4th size quartile  -0.351 -0.291 -0.470 -0.376 -0.402 -0.183 
 [0.174]**  [0.111]***  [0.291]  [0.530] [0.534] [0.132] 
3rd size quartile  -0.061 0.043  -0.016 0.073  -0.019  0.083 
 [0.049]  [0.051]  [0.193]  [0.196] [0.193] [0.039]** 
4th size quartile  0.029 0.186 0.386 0.552  0.385  0.224 
 [0.066]  [0.059]***  [0.181]**  [0.166]*** [0.179]** [0.036]***
Export Status in 1992    0.566       
   [0.026]***       
          
Observations 1359  1359  1359  880  880  1280 
Notes: standard errors are clustered at the 4-digit-ISIC industry level.  * indicates significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
Firm size is measured as the (log) number of employees measured in efficiency units relative to the 4-digit-ISIC industry mean.  Results presented in 
this table summarize the findings reported in Bustos (fortcoming).     